Introduction
Th e participation of social factor in the administration of justice is one of the fundamental principles of the justice system operation regulated by the Polish legislator. It has been enshrined in the most important legal act -the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997 1 in Art. 45 and 182. For the needs of the article, two possible types of the participation of citizenry in the administration of justice should be distinguished:
-through the assumed role in the proceedings (participation sensu stricto); -through the presence in a courtroom without assuming any role in the proceedings (participation sensu largo).
With regard to concrete forms of the participation of social factor in the administration of justices, the following three examples can be depicted:
-participation of lay judges in sentencing; -the institution of a community representative;
. In the 19th century trial, the mixed court developed, which retained elements of the inquisitorial court (most of all in preparatory proceedings). A main hearing was held according to the principle of both external and internal openness , was issued in a similar vein. Pursuant to Art. 315 of the CCP of 1928, a hearing was held orally and openly, with some exceptions envisaged in the Act. Post-war legislation referred to the rule of an open trial too. Th e Constitution of 1952 8 contained a provision in Art. 53 par. 1, according to which cases are resolved openly and publicly in all courts of the Polish People's Republic. In the 1950s, show trials were held outside court buildings, most of all in cases involving theft of public property and in political trials. Th is method was still used as late as in the end of the 1980s 9 . Th e rule of an open and public trial (with specifi ed exceptions) was appropriately included in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969.
Th e very notion of open and public proceedings can be understood in two ways: -as internal openness; -as external openness.
Internal openness should be understood as a principle referring solely to the litigation parties and individuals cooperating with them. It is a guarantee of adversarial proceedings. Its core are the parties' rights to access case fi les and participate in evidence-gathering acts. Th e participation of the parties (or individuals cooperating with them) will be full only if they are provided with unrestricted access to all information and acts connected with the litigation. In this aspect, the principle of an open trial is closely connected with the principle of the right to a court and a fair trial.
It has been rightly noticed that external openness should be treated as a separate rule -the rule of an open and public trial 10 referring to the entire society. And just this rule is regulated by Art. 45 par. 1 of the Constitution. An open and public trial is not understood by the Constitution as internal openness because it is embraced by the rule of a fair trial
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. Th us it involves open proceedings with regard to third parties (including the media).
Open proceedings resolving a case encompass: -open and public court sessions;
-broadly understood open and public litigation, which should be understood as a possibility of obtaining information about the course of proceedings by third parties and public opinion; -publicly announced judgment. Th e Constitution does not indicate what sessions should be open and public. It means that all sessions, as a rule, are held openly and publicly regardless of the type of proceedings: fi rst-instance, appeal or cassation. It is a standard procedure that cases should be resolved in a manner allowing audience to participate therein. Case settlement should be publicly announced. Th e constitutional legislator uses the notion of a judgment, which should be understood as a substantive ruling passed in individual proceedings. It obviously does not refer to rulings that do not concern the subject of litigation (e.g. discontinuance of proceedings), or rulings on incidental issues (e.g. restitution of a prior status -restitutio in integrum) 12 . A publicly announced ruling should be understood as both reading the sentence and providing essential reasoning thereto in an open session aft er terminated proceedings and providing third parties with public access to the ruling in a court building, or including its content in the collection of judicial decisions
System regulation

13
. Th e requirement of a public announcement of a judgment must be paid attention to. Although a trial may be held in secret, the ruling should always be made public. press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. It is a very similar regulation to the one contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Th e fact that both present and previous European legislation has . Th e rule of an open and public trial obviously does not refer to all proceedings since Art. 108 § 1 of the CCP stipulates that the deliberation and voting on the decision shall be conducted in a closed session. With regard to the exclusion of openness, it shall not be allowed when judgment is announced (Art. 45 par. 2 of the Constitution). Opposite to a hearing, a session is secret (Art. 95b of the CCP) even though the legislator has also introduced exceptions from this rule. A session may be open if it is specifi ed accordingly by the Act (the catalogue from Art. 95b § 2 of the CCP) and when the Court President or court rules otherwise. Th e Act imposes an obligation to carry out an open session when the defendant's criminal liability is to be decided thereon. Such sessions concern: discontinuance of proceedings (Art. 339 § 3 point 1 and 2 of the CCP), a conditional suspension of the proceedings (Art. 339 § 3 point 5 of the CCP), conditional discontinuance of proceedings (Art. 341 of the CCP), a sentence without a trial (Art. 343 § 5 of the CCP), a sentence without evidentiary proceedings (Art. 343a of the CCP), extradition (Art. 603 of the CCP), transfer and custody (Art. 607l § 1 of the CCP), execution of punishment or measure in case of refusal to transfer (Art. 607s § 3 of the CCP), and transfer and judgment execution (611c § 4 of the CCP, 611ti § 1 of the CCP). As rightly observed by H. Paluszkiewicz 17 , admitting to a session other persons than the participants of litigation in the above situations fulfi ls the standard of public proceedings. Community has an opportunity to fi nd out about the court's decision on the defendant's criminal liability, the content of a judgment and its reasoning.
It is worth paying attention here to Art. 418a of the CCP, according to which if a judgment was rendered in a secret session, the content of the judgment shall be made public by submitting its copy in the court's secretary offi ce for a seven-day period. At the same time, the Supreme Administrative Court noticed that a court's judgment is an offi cial document in the meaning of the Act on Access to Public Information and does not lose this character aft er it has been publicly announced or made public in a court's secretary offi ce
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. Furthermore, the Polish Constitution stipulates that each citizen shall have the right to obtain information on the activities of organs of public authority (Art. 61 of the Constitution). It shows that a purpose of both the legislator and bodies applying the law is the assurance of transparency of the activities of bodies of public authority. In this context, anonymization of rulings, which is discernible, e.g., in the Lex portal, is puzzling. It is depicted that in West European countries and the USA rulings posted in Internet portals are not subject to such anonymization. For instance, the ECHR decisions give the parties' names and surnames 19 . It should also be mentioned that the party may apply for decision's anonymization, which ECHR oft en accepts. Undeniably, Internet access to the full content of rulings would enhance community supervision and trust in the administration of justice. Th is issue is debatable and thus worth mentioning herein.
If pending proceedings attract considerable interest which would be beyond the court's organizational capacities, entry passes may be issued to a court room. Th is right is vested in the Court President
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. It may not, however, ensue a selection of persons admitted to participate in a hearing as audience even though entry passes may fi rst be granted to the media representatives, individuals connected with the litigation parties, or persons interested in the proceedings for scientifi c reasons 21 . A selection of persons admitted to a court room would apparently contradict the principle of an open and public trial. It could entail the admittance of persons favouring solely one party to the proceedings, or hostile to a witness thus evoking certain anxiety in him or her. It seems that the only case of a broadly understood selection may the situation regulated in Art. 359 of the CCP.
Art. 359 of the CCP indicates that the principle of an open and public trial is not tantamount to the full openness of a trial to everyone. § 1 thereof univocally sets forth that apart from the participants of the proceeding, a hearing may be solely attended by individuals who have come of age and are unarmed. Th is ban may be reversed by an order of the presiding judge. As far as minors are concerned, their presence in a trial may be justifi ed by their relations or ties with a party thereto or educational reasons
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. With regard to armed individuals, the presiding judge may permit them to attend a trial if they are obliged to carry weapons. What is more, persons in a condition incompatible with the court's dignity shall not be admitted to the trial. It concerns, most of all, people under the infl uence of alcohol or drugs, or individuals whose conduct or dress is inappropriate.
With the current development of technology, an indispensible element of the principle of open proceedings is the presence of the media in a trial. Art. 357 § 1 of the CCP obliges the court to permit the representatives of the media to make video and sound recordings of the trial. It is worth adding that an application for such permit should be submitted by a representative of a specifi ed medium; that is why the court acts upon the initiative of an applicant. Th is permit obviously concerns recording the trial by means of special equipment, i.e. a photo camera, sound recorder or video camera. A number of the media representatives in a trial may also be limited for technical conditions of a courtroom (the above mentioned issue of entry passes). In case of such restrictions, it is essential to maintain objectivity in choosing the media representatives. Paragraph 3 prescribes that the choice can be made on the fi rst come fi rst serve basis, or at random. If the course of a trial is disturbed by the media representatives, the court shall order them to leave a courtroom. Th e media may also be instructed to leave a courtroom if their presence embarrasses or confuses a witness. Th en it is a temporary leave of a courtroom only for the time of hearing a witness. Th erefore paragraph 4 assigns priority to the principle of substantial truth over the principle of an open trial 23 as it is more important to duly hear a witness than fulfi l the principle of open proceedings. As noticed by R. Koper 24 , the issue of recording a trial has been well balanced by the legislator. Agreeability of the regulation contained in Art. 357 of the CCP is, in his opinion, very clear, creating solutions reconciling opposing interests and goods.
Another very important regulation is also worth considering, namely Art. 13 of the Act of 26 January 1984 -Press Law
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. Paragraph 1 thereof sets forth that it is not allowed to express one's opinion about the settlement of litigation in the press before a judgment is in a fi rst-instance court. It is of vital importance as it assures the observance of the principle of judicial independence, consideration for the defendant's interest (in the aspect of presumed innocence), and guarantees citizens' right to reliable information 26 . Furthermore, paragraph 2 of the provision in question stipulates that personal data and image of a person against whom preparatory proceedings or litigation is held must not be published in the press, as well as personal data and image of witnesses and injured parties, unless they give their consent. As far as the consent of the participants of proceedings is concerned, it is pointed out that the nature and . It should be univocal. On the other hand, the prosecutor or court may permit to disclose personal data and image of individuals against whom preparatory proceedings or litigation is held due to important public interest. Th is decision is subject to a complaint. It seems that such a solution allows to balance both private interest of the participants of a criminal trial and public interest. Th e Constitutional Tribunal 28 ruled on the constitutionality of Art. 13 par. 3 of the Press Law because in its previous reading this provision did not envisage a possibility of submitting a complaint to a court against a decision of the prosecutor to permit the publication of data and image of participants of preparatory proceedings. Th e previous regulation was inconsistent with Art. 45 par. 1 and Art. 77 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. In eff ect of the Constitutional Tribunal's judgment, par. 4 envisaging the above mentioned complaint was added to Art. 13 of the Press Law.
A party may apply to a court for a permit to record the course of a trial using sound recording equipment (Art. 358 of the CCP). Th e court may refuse only if it adversely aff ects the regularity of proceedings. Th us such a refusal should be treated as an exception.
Th e Code of Criminal Procedure provides two categories of cases that are closed to the public; when they regard:
-a motion from the state prosecutor for discontinuance of the proceedings due to the non-accountability of the perpetrator and application of a precautionary measure; -a case of defamation or calumny; however, on a motion of the injured party, the hearing is held in open court.
Th ese are the categories of cases that are fully closed to the public ex lege. With regard to cases of defamation or calumny, if the injured party submits a motion for an open trial, it is fully open to the public ex lege. Th e court may not disregard such a motion. Th e reason for such a solution is the implementation of the provision of Art. 45 par. 2 of the Constitution, which enshrines important private interest as the cause of excluded openness of proceedings.
Art. 360 § 1 of the CCP establishes a possibility of excluding the public from all or part of the trial, where the public nature of a hearing may:
-be conducive to disturbance of public order, -off end decency, -disclose circumstances which in consideration of signifi cant State interests should remain secret, -infringe important private interests. Moreover, the court may exclude the public from a hearing if at least one of the accused is a minor, for the time of hearing a witness who has not turned 15 years old, and upon a motion of a person who fi led for prosecution. It is another situation when the CCP refers directly to Art. 45 par. 2 of the Constitution. Th e reasons listed in Art. 360 § 1 of the CCP correspond to those envisaged in the Constitution. A practical example of the application of Art. 360 § 1 of the CCP may be a hearing which was held on 24 November 2016 in the Regional Court in Białystok. Th e case involved the prosecution of Chechens accused of, among others, fi nancial support given to the so called Islamic State. According to the media 29 , some witnesses giving evidence in this trial feared for their lives. Amidst them doctors who helped one of the defendants. Media coverage ensued that the court excluded the public from the trial due to confidentiality of medical information and witnesses fearing for their safety. It may be presumed that the public was excluded from this case due to important private interest.
Pursuant to the reading of the provision in force since 5 August 2016
30
, Art. 360 § 2 sets forth that the prosecutor may object to the exclusion of the public from a hearing, which ensues its obligatory open pursuit. Th is objection may be raised only before the court issues a decision to exclude the public. In practice, before issuing a decision on the exclusion of the public from the proceedings, the court should request the prosecutor present in a trial to express his or her opinion on the exclusion of an open trial if the exclusion is grounded on Art. 360 § 1 point 1 of the CCP. If the prosecutor objects to the exclusion of an open trial, the court is not allowed to exclude it. As pointed out in the literature 31 , it is a serious infringement of the principle of equality of litigants since only a prosecutor is entitled to object; the defendant does not enjoy such a right. In principle, the court is an entity which evaluates whether a specifi c value or interest may be a reason for the exclusion of the public from a hearing. In this case, the court's powers have been transferred onto the prosecutor. Moreover, the requirement of justifying the exclusion of the public if the prosecutor objects to it does not result from the content of the provision. Th us it can be claimed that the prosecutor enjoys greater discretion than the court since the court is obliged to justify its decision about the exclusion of the public while the prosecutor does not have to do so if he or she objects to the exclusion
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. At the same time, a part of the doctrine points out that due to the maintenance of the right to defence by the participants of a criminal trial, prosecutor's objection should be supported by the reasoning and a possibility of appealing against it to the court 33 . Th en, the catalogue of persons who may attend a hearing despite the exclusion of the public (Art. 361 § 1 of the CCP) should be provided. Th ey are so called persons of trust. Apart from the litigants, they embrace: two persons designated by the public prosecutor, two by the auxiliary prosecutor, two by the private prosecutor and two by the defendant.
Persons of trust, however, cannot participate in a hearing if it is feared that confi dential information classifi ed as "secret" or "top secret" may be revealed. Additionally, persons of trust cannot participate in a hearing of a crown witness (Art. 13 par. 1 of the Act on the Crown Witness) and during reading incognito witness's testimony (Art. 393 § 4 of the CCP). Th e presiding judge may permit individuals other than persons of trust to attend a closed hearing even if information classifi ed as "secret" or "top secret" is revealed 34 . Th e presiding judge shall inform the persons attending the hearing of their obligation to keep secret any information learned during the hearing in a closed session, and warn them of the consequences of their failure to do so (Art. 362 of the CCP). As indicated by the Supreme Court, "the Court is absolutely obliged […] to carry out a hearing in such a manner […] as not to allow any violation of legally protected interests of the injured parties"
35 . If a motion is fi led to have a hearing held in a closed session, and if the motion has been fi led by the party or when the court fi nds it necessary, the hearing on the motion shall be conducted in a closed session (Art. 363 of the CCP).
Art. 364 § 1 of the CCP prescribes that the judgement shall be announced in open court. It is another reference to the absolute rule of an open trial contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Art. par. 2 sentence 2 -Th e Judgments shall be announced publicly) and European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 6, item 1). However, if all or part of the trial has been held in a closed session, the announcement of the statement of reasons for the judgement may be also made in a closed session fully or partly.
Conclusion
Th e principle of open proceedings is one of the essential and oldest principles of litigation. With the development of technology, its range and scope have greatly increased. Previously, a number of individuals who could follow a specifi c trial was limited to those who found enough room in a public square or courtroom. Nowadays, the principle of an open trial refers rather to the recipients of the media, i.e. radio programme listeners, TV viewers, Internet users or readers. Open proceedings are now an institution thanks to which the community may learn about the operation of the administration of justice. Th us it exerts actual impact on the image of judges, prosecutors, attorneys and legal advisors. Th e principle of an open trial may be an effective instrument to build social trust in the administration of justice. Ipso facto, it should enhance the quality of work of judicial staff and raise legal awareness and culture of the citizens.
It should be remembered that judicial power is the only power citizens cannot directly aff ect at all. Opposite to legislative and executive power, judicial power is not elected by the people. Due to the principle of irremovability of judges, citizens cannot express their approval or disapproval towards the representatives of judicial power. Judge's independence, on the other hand, ensues not only a lack of citizens' impact on judicial power, but it also precludes other powers' impact on the administration of justice. Th erefore the principle of an open trial is the only instrument allowing to exert control that is necessary to guarantee appropriate operation or work of every, even best educated and morally shaped entity. Such control is possible solely thanks to the access to information about the operation of judicial power that citizens are provided with. Information can only be obtained, in turn, if the external openness of proceedings is guaranteed. Lack of such information would evoke citizens distrust of the representatives of justice on the one hand, and negatively aff ect judges' motivation to carry out a proper service on the other hand. Activities of each power, including judicial power, are subject to the requirement of transparency. As ruled by the Constitutional Tribunal, a purpose of the principle of an open trial is to "assure judge's impartiality and regularity of proceedings, and motivate the court to employ greater diligence and conscientiousness in the proceedings"
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. Nevertheless, we should not forget that open proceedings must have certain limits. We should take into account circumstances that may arise in practice which would ensue the need to sacrifi ce the principle of an open trial for the sake of greater good. Such limits have been envisaged both by the Polish Constitution and Acts (including the Code of Criminal Procedure). Disclosure of information might imply serious infringement of private or public interests. We can easily imagine many situations where the presence of third parties, including the media, could threaten the above mentioned interests. It may be a business interest of an entrepreneur when his or her competitor is present in a courtroom while his or her business strategy is discussed or mentioned during a trial. A private interest may be wellbeing of a victim of a rape who fi led for the prosecution. Violation of a public interest, in turn, may be a public hearing of a testimony given by a high rank offi cer of Internal Security Agency or Intelligence Service which could infringe a State secret, which is, ipso facto, the Republic of Poland's interest. We can imagine a situation when the subject of litigation is certain reprehensible conduct on the grounds of a race or worldview the public opinion is keenly debating. , improper application of the principle of an open trial oft en adversely aff ects the principle of presumed innocence. We witness a recent phenomenon of conscious or intentional "leaks" of information from preparatory proceedings. It concerns both case fi les' photographs (publishing photos from the case fi les from preparatory proceedings in the so called "bug aff air") and service offi cials making video recordings of suspects being detained. Such leaks are generally aimed at concrete persons or groups. Seeing an image of a handcuff ed person, the public forms a negative opinion about this individual even though he or she is still innocent. Many a time, further acquittal does not change the opinion previously forged by the media coverage about the acquitted person. In such situations, the principle of presumed innocence simply does not work. Ensuing social pressure puts the court, defence counsel and, above all, the defendant, in a very diffi cult position.
Additionally, some attention should be paid to the transformation of traditional media (the press, television and the Internet) into modern social media. With regard to them, a role of a journalist and recipient mingles. In one place (portal), a recipient can be a journalist while a journalist -a recipient. It adversely aff ects the quality and manner of conveying information. It concerns both facts or opinions posted on Facebook or Tweeter as well video recordings uploaded in YouTube. It appears that within this area there are no binding principles except the principle of decency which is, nevertheless, excessively abused. At the same time, a range of social media is much broader than traditional ones. Th at is why a scale of abuses connected with publishing information about litigations is so vast.
Th e principle of open proceedings is enshrined by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. It fulfi ls not only a system role but also assures regular and proper operation of the justice system by providing public access to its activities. Th is access is the only instrument aff ecting discipline and impartiality of the judiciary. Th is principle, however, cannot be abused in any way. It could adversely aff ect not only the image of the justice system but, above all, the image of private individuals. Regardless of the above, the principle of open proceedings is and should continue to be a fundamental pillar of a democratic state of law. 
